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Protect · Cryptographic modernization

Post-Quantum Cryptography Readiness & Migration

Find where your organization depends on cryptography, decide what must change first, and plan a migration to the NIST post-quantum standards that your systems and vendors can actually support.

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Why this needs a plan now

  • Today's public-key cryptography has a known end

    RSA, Diffie-Hellman and elliptic-curve schemes protect most key exchange and digital signatures. A sufficiently capable quantum computer would break them. NIST has published replacement standards and transition guidance.

  • Some data is exposed before that day

    Traffic recorded now can be decrypted later. Information that must stay confidential for many years is the first concern, often called harvest now, decrypt later.

  • Cryptography is everywhere, and mostly undocumented

    It sits in TLS, VPNs, PKI, identity, code signing, application libraries, vendor products and connected systems. Most organizations have no inventory of it.

Illustrative map

Where cryptography lives

A typical dependency map. Each area uses key establishment, digital signatures, or both, and each migrates on a different timeline.

  • TLS and webKey establishment · signaturesBrowsers, APIs, load balancers, CDN
  • VPN and networkKey establishment · signaturesIPsec, remote access, site links
  • PKI and certificatesSignaturesInternal and public certificate authorities
  • Identity and SSOSignaturesTokens, federation, device trust
  • Code and firmware signingSignaturesBuild pipelines, updates, long-lived devices
  • Application librariesKey establishment · signaturesEmbedded algorithms and protocol versions
  • Data at rest and backupsKey wrappingLong retention raises the urgency
  • Vendors and cloud servicesDepends on the providerRoadmaps and contract terms

The standards we plan against

Migration targets come from NIST's published standards, not from vendor claims.

  • FIPS 203 · ML-KEM

    Module-lattice key-encapsulation mechanism, for establishing shared keys.

  • FIPS 204 · ML-DSA

    Module-lattice digital signature algorithm, for general-purpose signatures.

  • FIPS 205 · SLH-DSA

    Stateless hash-based digital signature algorithm, built on different mathematics from ML-DSA.

  • NIST IR 8547

    Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST's guidance on moving from quantum-vulnerable algorithms to the standards above.

Key establishment and digital signatures migrate separately. A connection that uses a hybrid post-quantum key exchange can still be authenticated by a classical certificate; we record and plan the two independently.

A phased approach

  1. Discover

    Build the cryptographic inventory.

    • Cryptographic assets, algorithms and protocols
    • Certificate and key dependencies
    • Vendor and cloud-service dependencies
    • Retention horizons for sensitive data
  2. Assess

    Decide what matters first.

    • Quantum exposure and migration urgency
    • Business and technical criticality
    • Crypto-agility of each system
    • Vendor support, compatibility and operational risk
  3. Plan

    Agree the route.

    • Prioritized migration roadmap
    • Target cryptographic architecture
    • Standards-aligned options, including hybrid schemes
    • Procurement and vendor requirements; testing and rollback strategy
  4. Pilot and migrate

    Prove it before it scales.

    • Controlled interoperability testing
    • Performance and compatibility assessment
    • Implementation support where technically appropriate
    • Transition evidence and documentation

What you receive

  • Cryptographic inventory with an owner per system
  • Exposure and urgency assessment
  • Prioritized migration roadmap and target architecture
  • Vendor and procurement requirements
  • Pilot results and transition documentation, where pilots are in scope

What this work is not

  • An assessment does not by itself make a system quantum-resistant or compliant with any standard.
  • No claim of protection against every future attack. Algorithms and guidance will continue to change, which is why crypto-agility is part of the work.
  • Cryptography inside vendor products changes on the vendor's schedule. We record it and help you require it.
  • Not a product sale. No reseller agreements or referral fees.

Who it is for

  • Organizations holding data that must stay confidential for many years
  • Products and devices with long service lives or signed updates
  • Suppliers whose customers have started to ask for a post-quantum plan
  • Security and architecture teams that need an inventory before they can commit to a date

Questions

Do we need to replace all our cryptography now?

No. The first step is to know what you have. Migration is then ordered by how long the data must stay confidential, how critical the system is and what your vendors support.

What is the difference between post-quantum key exchange and post-quantum signatures?

Key exchange protects the confidentiality of a session; signatures prove identity and integrity. They use different standards (ML-KEM for key establishment, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA for signatures) and are usually migrated at different times.

Our CDN already supports post-quantum TLS. Are we done?

That protects one connection, when the client also supports it. It does not cover certificates, internal services, VPNs, signing, stored data or your vendors. The inventory shows what remains.

What is crypto-agility?

The ability to change algorithms, keys and parameters without redesigning the system. It reduces the cost of this migration and the next one.

Do you implement the migration?

We support pilots and implementation where it is technically appropriate, as separately scoped work after the roadmap is agreed.

Discuss a PQC readiness assessment

Tell us your deadline and current situation. You will get a direct answer on whether this is a fit — at no charge and with no obligation.